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LABOR LAW
Among the labor law cases decided last term by the Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit was that of Satterwhite v. United
Parcel Service, Inc. I In that case the plaintiff employees, after
losing in arbitration, brought an action under section 16(b) of the
Fair Labor Standards Act' for overtime compensation. The Tenth
Circuit decided against the employees, holding that when a wage
dispute is submitted to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement, the employees may not
thereafter maintain a Fair Labor Standards Act suit for recovery
on the basis of the same factual occurrence as that presented to
the arbitrator. In other words, resolution of this kind of wage
claim by an arbitrator is dispositive of a statutory claim under
section 16(b) of the Act. The Satterwhite case is commented on
more extensively below.
In the second comment of this section the Tenth Circuit's
decision in NLRB v. Serv-AUI Co.3 is analyzed. In that case the
affected union had filed an 8(a)(5) refusal to bargain charge4
against the employer for its alleged refusal to execute a contract
with that union. The National Labor Relations Board found an
8(a)(5) violation in terms of repeated occurrences of the employer's refusal to execute a contract with the union. The Tenth
Circuit reversed the Board, holding that the unfair labor practice
complaint was barred by the Labor-Management Relations Act
section 10(b) statute of limitations.'
Two additional labor law cases are noted here briefly. In
Bill's Coal Co. v. NLRB,6 the employer had made extreme antiunion statements in an attempt to oppose the unionization of his
plant, and, at about the same time, had laid off nine employees
who had signed union cards. The Tenth Circuit upheld the
Board's finding of an 8(a)(1) interference violation by the employer, but reversed the finding of an 8(a)(3) discrimination to
discourage membership violation.' The Tenth Circuit's reversal
1 496 F.2d
3

448 (10th Cir. 1974).
29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970).
491 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1974).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
Id. § 160(b).
493 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1974).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
Id. § 158(a)(3).
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of the finding of an 8(a) (3) violation was based on the ground that
the Board's finding of a discriminatory layoff did not find substantial support in the record.
Gordon v. Laborers' International Union of North America'
presented the Tenth Circuit with a consolidated appeal from several lower court suits. In the facts of the case the International
Union had imposed a trusteeship upon one of its locals because
of the local's independent action in bargaining on its own and
signing an agreement with the employer group in violation of the
constitution of the International. The local's independent action
was due to its discontent with the representation scheme for the
District Counsel which had been set up as the unitary bargaining
committee to negotiate with the designated employer association.
The Tenth Circuit here upheld the imposition of a trusteeship by
the International on the grounds that it was proper under the
provisions of Title I of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act.' 0 In addition, the court held that section 101 of
that Act," which gives every member of a labor organization
equal rights and privileges of participation was inapplicable to
international or intermediate bodies such as the District Counsel.
Therefore, the court concluded that the imposition of a proportional representation system upon the District Counsel, as requested by the local, was not mandated by the Act.
ARBITRATION AND THE STATUTORY RIGHT TO SUE:
ALTERNATIVE OR PARALLEL REMEDIES
Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc.,
496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1974)
Following the arbitrator's decision that the employee's discharge was for cause, the employee sued under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.' In a per
curiam opinion, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that an employee who voluntarily submitted a grievance based on racial discrimination to
final and binding arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement was precluded from maintaining a court action on the same
I.

1 490 F.2d 133 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 43 U.S.L.W. 3209 (U.S. Dec. 15, 1974)
(No. 73-1821).
"0 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-66 (1970).
Id. § 411.
415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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issue. 2 In 1974, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed GardnerDenver, finding the employee's statutory right to a trial de novo
3
under Title VII not foreclosed by prior submission to arbitration.
At the time of the Supreme Court's reversal of GardnerDenver, Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc., was pending
before the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. The controversy in Satterwhite concerned elimination by the employer of
two 15-minute coffee breaks a day. The collective bargaining
agreement between the employer, United Parcel Service, Inc.,
and the union5 did not specifically cover coffee breaks but did
provide for a grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration.' The employees grieved the elimination of coffee breaks,
seeking compensation at one and one-half times the hourly wage
for the extra half-hour a day worked in lieu of coffee breaks. On
submission to arbitration, the arbitrator held that the company
could not unilaterally eliminate the paid coffee breaks, awarded
the extra half-hour a day compensation to the employees, and, in
a supplemental decision, directed that the payment be at straight
7
time rather than at time and one-half.
Fifty-nine employees then brought suit under section 16(b)
of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for payment at time and
one-half, in accordance with section 7(a)(1) of the FLSA which
provides pay for work in excess of 40 hours a week at one and onehalf times the straight rate.8 Section 16(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act provides employees with the statutory right to recover
for violations by employers of the wages and hours provisions of
the FLSA by bringing an action in any court of competent jurisdiction.' The district court dismissed the employee's action on
the basis of the court of appeals' decision in Gardner-Denver.On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit upheld the judgment against the employees, stating that prior submission of the wage claim to binding arbitration precluded a suit under section 16(b) of the FLSA.10
2 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
3 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
£ 496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1974).
Delivery Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local Union No. 435.
The agreement provided that the arbitrator's award would be binding and conclusive unless it was beyond the jurisdiction given the arbitrator by the agreement. No claim
was made in this case that the award exceeded jurisdictional limits.
496 F.2d at 449.
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1970).
Id. § 216(b).
496 F.2d 448 (10th Cir. 1974).
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I. FEDERAL POLICY FAVORING ARBITRATION
The appellants in Satterwhite argued that the Supreme
Court's decision in Gardner-Denversecured their statutory right
to bring suit in federal court irrespective of prior submission to
arbitration." This assertion raised the most controversial issue
posed by the Supreme Court opinion: Did Gardner-Denveropen
the doors of the courts to independent adjudication of already
arbitrated issues on the basis of statutory rights? 2
The Tenth Circuit refused to attach a broad, inclusive reading to the Court's preservation of the statutory right to sue in
Title VII actions. Instead, the court relied on Gardner-Denver's
reaffirmation of the federal policy favoring arbitration as determinative in Satterwhite.3 The federal policy favoring arbitration
had been previously expressed in a number of decisions, most
notably the Steelworkers Trilogy cases." These cases emphasized
arbitration as the vehicle to promote industrial stability and
peace; 5 defined the role of the arbitrator as the dispenser of industrial justice; and, of major significance, restricted the role to
be played by the court in labor disputes previously submitted to
arbitration:
The refusal of courts to review the merits of an arbitration award is
the proper approach to arbitration under collective bargaining
agreements. The federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined if courts had the final say on the merits
of the award."6

The court of appeals viewed the exclusion of Title VII rights
from the general principle precluding a statutorily-based action
after submission to arbitration as an exception. Thus the issue in
Satterwhite was defined by the court to be whether rate of pay
for overtime, statutorily protected in the FLSA, was subject to
the general rule of election of remedies or was in the nature of an
exception, such as afforded Title VII rights in Gardner-Denver.
Id. at 450.
See Getman, Can Collyer and Gardner-DenverCo-Exist? A Postscript,49 IND. L.J.
285 (1974).
" Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59 (1974).
" United Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United
Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).
11United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574
(1960).
,1 United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,
596 (1960).
11Satterwhite v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 496 F.2d 448, 450 (10th Cir. 1974).
'
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The court of appeals culled from Gardner-Denvertwo factors
essential to the creation of an exception: the nature of the right
must be of a personal rather than collective character; and a
relatively clear legislative intent to override a policy favoring election of remedies should exist. In analyzing the Satterwhite
complaint, the court juxtaposed Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
against the Fair Labor Standards Act, contract rights against
statutory rights, and racial discrimination against rate of pay for
overtime.
II. THE NATURE OF THE RIGHT
Status as an exception rests in part on the nature of the right
being protected by the statutory privilege to sue. The Supreme
Court recognized this aspect, stating "that a union may waive
certain statutory rights related to collective activity, such as the
right to strike."" The court of appeals focused on two interrelated
factors in determining into which category the overtime wage
provision of the FLSA fell. Was the right personal or collective
in nature? Was the right primarily related to "shop" law or public
law? The two appear to merge when addressing the degree to
which the protected right has been traditionally a subject of
collective bargaining as contrasted to a right basically peripheral
to union activity.
In assessing the right involved in Gardner-Denver, the Supreme Court found that harmony between the union and the
individual cannot be presumed where racial discrimination is involved. 9 However, in Satterwhite, the court of appeals found
"[olne of the highest objectives of any union is to get all the
money possible for all of its members." 2 In considering which
rights could be waived, the Supreme Court noted that "rights
. . .conferred on employees collectively to foster the processes of
bargaining . . . properly may be exercised or relinquished by the
union as collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits
for unit members."'" Applying the Supreme Court's economic
benefit test in Satterwhite, the court of appeals found "[wlages
and hours . . .at the heart of the collective-bargaining process
. . . more akin to collective rights than to individual rights
" Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
i' Id. at 58 n.19.
496 F.2d at 451.
21 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
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....
,22 And, the court saw as evidentiary support for this conclusion the fact that 58 employees joined the initial complaint in
Satterwhite, testifying to the "collective-shop"23 nature of the
FLSA provision concerning rate of overtime pay.
I.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT

While recognizing the federal policy favoring arbitration, the
Supreme Court distinguished the statutory right involved under
Title VII from an employee's contractual rights under a collective
bargaining agreement, and decided that deferral to arbitration
would not comport with the congressional objective that federal
courts should be responsible for enforcing the rights granted the
individual under Title VII. 24 In line with this portion of the Supreme Court's analysis in Gardner-Denver,the Satterwhite court
differentiated the congressional intent with regard to statutory
rights involving racial discrimination (Title VII) and those involving wages and hours (FLSA).
In the early years of the administration of the Fair Labor
Standards Act,25 numerous section 16(b) actions were litigated. 21
In these cases, the U.S. Supreme Court had occasion to analyze
the policy behind the FLSA; of particular importance was the
case of Brooklyn Savings Bank v. O'Neil.2 7 In analyzing the congressional intent behind FLSA, the Court discovered a public
policy of protecting certain groups of workers from substandard
wages and excessive hours. This legislative protection was accorded in recognition of the unequal bargaining power between
employees and employers. In particular the Act sought to aid the
unprotected and unorganized workers-those who lacked sufficient bargaining power to secure sufficient wages. The growth of
labor unions and the emphasis since afforded the collective bargaining process abrogated to a substantial extent the importance
of the FLSA, in that employees now have the ability to organize
and assert their interests through contract negotiations and to
n 496 F.2d at 451.
n Id.
1, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 56 (1974).
2 FLSA was enacted in 1938.
n See City Serv. Cleaning Contractors v. Vanzo, 179 Misc. 2d 368, 39 N.Y.S. 2d 24
(Sup. Ct. 1942), afJ'd, 266 App. Div. 660, 41 N.Y.S.2d 210 (1943), which held that the right
of suit under FLSA section 16(b) is a "substantive" right; such a suit could not be
restrained because of a collective bargaining agreement compelling arbitration, which is
a remedial right. A similar conclusion was reached in Bailey v. Karolyna Co., 50 F. Supp.
142 (D.C.N.Y. 1943).
- 324 U.S. 697 (1945).
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acquire new and expanded rights and privileges in labor agreements.
In a footnote, the Court in Brooklyn Savings Bank cited the
legislative intent to give employees the means to assert a statutory right by maintaining a court action to recover wages due.28
The legislative intent expressed in Brooklyn Savings Bank to
allow individual suits by workers to recover wages, was aimed
primarily at unprotected, unorganized workers. In Satterwhite,
the workers were organized into a union, occupied a relatively
strong position in relation to their employer, and could assert
their right through the collective bargaining process and grievance procedure, with a final step of binding arbitration.
In reviewing the legislative history of Title VII, the Supreme
Court found that Congress had attached "highest priority" to the
Civil Rights Act;2 9 discovered a congressional intent that the statutory right to sue supplemented existing laws and institutions
relating to discrimination; 3 and that "Congress gave private individuals a significant role in the enforcement process of Title
VII."' In contrast, the Tenth Circuit concluded that private enforcement was not a major objective of FLSA; 32 and that FLSA
did not, as Title VII, present an intent to accord parallel, overlapping relief apart from contractual remedies.Y
In making this determination, the court of appeals examined
the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947,'3 which it discovered expressed
a congressional policy favoring the collective bargaining process
over judicial review. 5 In order to effectuate this intent, the
Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947 established a good faith defense to
FLSA actions.3" The court of appeals noted that Congress provided neither a good faith defense in Title VII actions nor directly
" Id. at 705 n.16.
5 Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
Id. at 48-49.
" Id. at 45.
' 496 F.2d at 450.
"Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 251-62 (1970).
" In its declaration of policy behind the Portal-to-Portal Act of 1947, Congress expressed dissatisfaction with judicial interpretation of FLSA in disregard of longestablished customs and contracts between employers and employees, and with the liability imposed on employers as a result of strict interpretation. Congress thus declared a
policy to protect the right of collective bargaining and limit the jurisdiction of the courts,
by limiting the liability of employers in certain cases, and permitting a good faith defense
to FLSA claims by employees. 29 U.S.C. §§ 251, 259 (1970).
=Id.
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addressed the relationship between collective bargaining and judicial review.37 The court concluded that the difference in approach as illustrated by the inclusion of a good faith defense and
the emphasis on collective bargaining in the Fair Labor Standards Act "indicates that Congress intended that wage disputes
and racial disputes should not receive the same treatment."3
Thus, to the extent that contract provisions paralleling
FLSA statutory rights are included within the collective bargaining agreement, the statutory rights are placed within the province
of the arbitrator, who, applying the law of the shop, decides the
relative rights of the parties. Under these circumstances, prior
submission to arbitration precludes the right to bring suit in federal court.

IV.

THE BALANCING TEST IN

Satterwhite

The Tenth Circuit inferred the necessity of a balancing test,
wherein both the nature of the protected right and congressional
intent were combined in weighing the federal policy favoring arbitration of industrial disputes against the statutory right to a court
suit. In applying this balancing test to a wage claim under FLSA,
the court found the scale tipped toward arbitration, concluding
that wages and hours were better suited to the arbitral forum
than a claim of racial discrimination under Title VII. While the
law of the shop applied by arbitrators lends itself to pay issues,
Title VII cases require consideration of public law concepts. The
court stated that in Gardner-Denver
[tihe conclusion that the anti-discrimination policy rated higher
than that favoring arbitration of labor disputes was determinative.
We find nothing in any pertinent legislative history or court decision
to indicate that Congress, by the grant of a right to private suit
under FLSA § 16(b), intended to establish a policy preference for
the determination of a wage dispute in judicial rather than arbitral
proceedings."
V.

CONCLUSION

Favoritism towards arbitration as a general principle is nothing more than the judicial policy of election of remedies. In effect,
11496 F.2d at 451. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the absence of an intent to discriminate, or even a good intention,
does not redeem discriminatory employment practices. According to that case, the intended thrust of Title VII was to the consequences of employment practices rather than
simply the motivation behind them.
" 496 F.2d at 451.
S

Id.
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a union may elect for its members the remedy of compulsory,
binding arbitration on issues relating to the shop, which have a
collective impact, and on which harmony between the union and
individual members can be presumed.
The finality accorded the arbitrator's decision on the merits
is dependent upon whether the right is one whose adjudication
can be properly waived by the union in a collective bargaining
agreement in favor of arbitration. If the right is waivable, the
courts will defer to the arbitrator's special competence in the law
of the shop and deny judicial review on the merits. By refusing
to entertain a suit under FLSA, the court of appeals in
Satterwhite effectively defers to the arbitrator's decision, recognizing the Supreme Court's reaffirmation in Gardner-Denverof
the deferral doctrine and placing Title VII in proper perspective
as an exception to this doctrine.
Although Satterwhite leaves unresolved whether a statutory
right to sue will be precluded by prior resort to arbitration under
statutes similar to the Fair Labor Standards Act, the method of
analysis utilized in Satterwhite, in terms of balancing the policy
favoring arbitration against the statutory right involved, could
readily be applied. Gardner-Denverwill undoubtedly control
when individual civil rights are involved, but Satterwhite correctly construes the scope and impact of Gardner-Denver:in the
usual areas of industrial disputes and interpretation of collective
bargaining provisions arbitration will remain the favored forum.
Loretta B. Paris
II. LABOR LAW-LIMITATION OF ACTIONS-THE
LMRA 10(b) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AND THE DEMANDS UPON THE DEFENSE
NLRB v. Serv-AU Co., 491 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1974)
In the early part of last year the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit decided the case of NLRB v. Serv-AUl Co.' in which
the court addressed the issue of the proper application of the
statute of limitations under section 10(b) of the LaborManagement Relations Act.2 This 10(b) statute of limitations
provides that a complaint will not issue upon any unfair labor
practice occurring more than 6 months before the filing of the
1 491

F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1974).
2 29 U.S.C. 160(b) (1970).
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charge with the National Labor Relations Board and service of a
copy upon the party charged.' Because this 10(b) limitations period is relatively short, interesting situations have arisen when an
unfair labor practice is repeatedly committed. If the aggrieved
party neglects to file an unfair labor practice charge within 6
months of the initial instance of the unfair labor practice but does
file a charge within 6 months of a later recurrence of the same
unfair labor practice, is the charge barred by section 10(b)? That
is, does the limitation period begin to run from the first incident
of an unfair labor practice, so that the charge is barred by the
running of the initial 6-month limitation period; or does the statute begin to run anew upon each recurrence of the unfair labor
practice, so that the charge is not barred by 10(b) since it fell
within 6 months of a repeated occurrence?
The wording of the 10(b) statute of limitations suggests that
this kind of recurrence of the same unfair labor practice within
the 6-month period immediately preceeding the charge would not
result in the barring of the charge, because the charge could be
based entirely upon the unfair labor practice within the period.
The language of the statute merely proscribes a complaint issued
on the basis of an unfair labor practice occurring more than 6
months prior to the charge,4 and in true recurrence situations the
basis of the charge would be the later unfair labor practice that
took place within the period. When confronted with this issue,
however, courts have gone both ways depending upon the type of
unfair labor practice and the circumstances of the particular case.
In many instances the courts have found that the charge is not
barred, frequently applying the continuing violation and continuing obligation doctrines.' But in other cases, like that of Serv-AUl,
courts have gone the other way and have found that the charge
is barred by the running of the 10(b) statute of limitations.
In this comment the decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in the Serv-AUI case will be carefully examined,
together with a comparison of that case with decisions on similar
facts in other jurisdictions. In this treatment special emphasis
I Id. The statute makes an exception for persons who are prevented from filing their
charge because of service in the armed forces-for them the 6-month period begins to run
from the date of their discharge.
Id.
See Melville Confections, Inc. v. NLRB, 327 F.2d 689 (7th Cir. 1964); NLRB v.
White Constr. & Eng'r Co., 204 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1953).

LABOR LAW

1975

will be placed on an analysis of the rationale offered by the court
for barring the complaint.

I.

THE

Serv-AlU

CASE

In Serv-A U, an employer association composed of plumbing
and piping contractors had entered into a collective bargaining
agreement with the designated union.' That agreement allowed
non-association members to become parties by separately signing
the association agreement, and Serv-All Co., Inc. chose to do so.
The association agreement further provided that employers
would be bound by succeeding collective bargaining agreements,
including amendments, extensions, and renewals, unless the
employer gave 60-days written notice. At no time did Serv-All
give this kind of written notice. Through later negotiations the
termination date of the collective bargaining agreement was extended, and toward the end of that extended period the employer
association and the union began negotiations for a new collective
bargaining agreement. When the negotiations failed to produce
an agreement, the union struck the employer association and in
July 1970 those parties signed a formal contract.7
In June 1970, at a point in' time prior to the 10(b) 6-month
statute of limitations period, Serv-All filed a representation petition with the Board claiming that the union no longer represented
a majority of its employees. In September, Serv-All ceased paying
fringe benefits to the union and did not give its employees the
wage increases provided for in the new collective bargaining
agreement.' At a later time within the 10(b) limitations period a
hearing was held on the representation petition. At that hearing
the president of Serv-All, in replying to a question put by union
counsel, stated that he would not sign the agreement reached
between the union and the employer association.' Also, on several
occasions within 6 months of the filing of the charge the union's
1 491 F.2d at 1273. The employer association was named the Mechanical Contractors
Association, and the union was the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices
of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States & Canada.
Id. at 1274.
Id.
The pertinent part of the transcript contained the following:
Q. If I handed it [the agreement] to you now, would you sign it?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why not?
A. That's my purpose for being here.
Id. at 1275.
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business manager tried to reach the employer concerning this
matter, but was unable to do so. 10
The union filed a refusal to bargain charge" on March 18,
1971. In considering the charge, the Board held that although the
employer's initial refusal to sign or abide by the contract occurred
outside the 10(b) 6-month limitations period, other instances
within the 6-month period were sufficient to indicate that the
initial refusal to bargain recurred, specifically the colloquy between the union counsel and the company president at the representation hearing. Therefore, the Board concluded that the
charge was not barred. 2
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the
Board, however, holding first that whether the conduct of the
employer several months preceeding the limitations period constituted an unfair labor practice was a stale issue, because that
conduct came within the scope of the 10(b) bar. Secondly, the
court held that there was not sufficient conduct by the employer
within the limitations period to amount to recurrence of the possible initial refusal to bargain. What would have been needed in
this regard would have been a specific request by the union to sign
or negotiate, followed by a specific refusal by the employer. The
Tenth Circuit could not accept that the president's statement at
the representation hearing constituted a refusal to bargain. Finally, the court also held that the Board's decision was faulty as
a matter of law "and not dependent on the fact issue of whether
[Serv-All] refused to sign [the agreement] during the six month
period preceding the complaint."' 3 That is, under these particular
circumstances, even if the employer had committed an unfair
labor practice outside the 6-month period by refusing to sign or
abide by the contract and that refusal had been repeated within
the 6-month period, the charge still would have been barred by
section 10(b).
II.

CASES DECIDED IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS ON SIMILAR FACTS

The Tenth Circuit decision in Serv-Al follows decisions on
similar facts in two other circuits. In the important case of NLRB
v. McCready & Sons, Inc.,' decided by the Sixth Circuit in 1973,
tO 199 NLRB No. 159 (1973).
"
"

29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1970).
491 F.2d at 1274-75.
Id. at 1275.
482 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1973).
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the employers had negotiated with the designated union on a
multi-employer basis, with the agreement reached in those negotiations calling for execution of individual agreements by each
employer at a later time. The union initially presented contracts
to the employers for their signature at a point in time outside the
limitations period, at which time the employers unequivocally
refused to sign. Subsequently these same employers again refused
to sign when given another opportunity within the 6-month limitations period. The union filed a refusal to bargain charge more
than 6 months after the initial refusal to sign the contract, but
within 6 months of subsequent refusals. 5 In spite of the definite
repetition of the unfair labor practice within the limitations period, the Sixth Circuit held that the charge was barred by section
10(b).
In finding the charge barred, the McCready court carefully
examined the purpose behind the section 10(b) statute of limitations and concluded that its purpose was to protect against stale
claims and to give alleged violators an opportunity to prepare
defenses." In the court's analysis the employer would defend the
refusal to bargain charge by denying that a contract binding upon
him had in fact been formed. Such a defense would involve references to facts surrounding the contract negotiations. With the
passage of time, however, these facts would become harder and
harder to prove, and therefore the defense would bear an everincreasing burden.' 7 In this way the McCready court looked to the
needs of the defense and found the unfair labor practice charge
barred by section 10(b) because of burdens upon the defense in
going outside the 6-month period to make out its case.
This reasoning in NLRB v. McCready & Sons, Inc. in looking
to the demands upon the defense was explicitly adopted by the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in Serv-AU1.'8 Therefore,
two circuits on similar facts have found a refusal to bargain
charge barred because of the burden upon the defense to go outside the period to make its case. The First Circuit, in NLRB v.
Field & Sons, Inc.,'" also held that the charge was barred on
Id. at 873.
Id. at 875. For a similar statement of the purposes behind section 10(b), see NLRB
v. Waterfront Employers, 211 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1954).
' NLRB v. McCready & Sons, Inc., 482 F.2d 872, 875 (6th Cir. 1973).
" 491 F.2d at 1275.
, 462 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1972).
"
"
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similar facts, but did so on a quite different rationale2" which was
not embraced by either the McCready" or Serv-A112 courts. The
circuits are split on this issue of a section 10(b) bar, however, in
that in the case of NLRB v. Strong13 the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit held on similar facts that the charge would not be
barred by section 10(b). The Ninth Circuit there found that refusals by the employer to sign the collective bargaining agreement
within the 6-month limitation period in and of themselves constituted unfair labor practices,24 and so concluded that the charge
would not be barred. This older case did not even consider the
McCready/Serv-AUl rationale of looking to the demands upon the
defense to go outside the 6-month period.
III.

THE REFUSAL TO APPLY THE CONTINUING OBLIGATION DOCTRINE

In earlier failure to bargain cases, the Board and the courts
have sometimes applied the continuing obligation doctrine,
thereby finding the charge not barred by section 10(b). In the case
of NLRB v. White Construction Co.,5 for example, the petitioning union had been selected as the employees' collective bargaining representative in a representation election, and later the
Board certified the union as the exclusive bargaining representative. The employer originally declined to recognize the union
immediately after the election, more than 6 months prior to the
filing of the charge, and then persisted in that refusal down to
within 11 days of the filing of the complaint. In this regard the
court found that the employer expressly refused to bargain with
the designated union on two definite dates well within the section
10(b) period. Then the court held:
Respondent's duty to deal with the certified union was a continuing
20 Id. at 751. In giving a rationale for its decision to find the charge barred, the First
Circuit here distinguishes between breach of a general duty, as to which each refusal may
be a new unfair labor practice, and failure to perform a particular act, such as to execute
an agreement. In the former situation a charge based upon repetition of the same unfair
labor practice within the period would not be barred, whereas it would be barred with the
latter.
21 See 482 F.2d at 874, where the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit states that it
does not embrace the distinction made in this regard by the First Circuit in the Field &
Sons case.
See 491 F.2d at 1275, where the Tenth Circuit agreed with the result reached in
Field & Sons, but remained silent as to the merits of the rationale offered there.
386 F.2d 929 (9th Cir. 1967).
24 Id. at 931.
204 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1953). See also International Union, UAW v. NLRB, 363 F.2d
702 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
11 204 F.2d at 952.
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one. Since its refusal continued well into the six month period immediately preceding the filing of the charge, the Board correctly
held that the complaint was timely filed. 7

Thus, the continuing obligation doctrine was applied and no
10(b) statute of limitations bar was found in that context. The
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit refused to apply the continuing obligation doctrine in McCready however, reasoning that
application of that doctrine to a charge of refusal to execute a
contract would be inconsistent with the purposes of section
10(b).28 The Tenth Circuit in Serv-AUI also implicitly refused to
apply the continuing obligation doctrine through its adoption of
both the result and rationale of the McCready case."9
This McCready/Serv-AUI approach of not applying the continuing obligation doctrine, and instead finding the charge barred
by looking to the demands upon the defense, marks a significant
change from that of previous section 10(b) cases. In earlier 10(b)
statute of limitations cases, the courts did not even consider the
issue of the possible demands upon the defense, and certainly did
not answer that issue along the McCready/Serv-All lines. In the
case of NLRB v. White Construction Co. ,0 for instance, the Fifth
Circuit did not consider possible demands upon the defense in
going outside the period to make its case. If it had done so the
result might have been quite different. In that case the employer
might well have wished to defend against the charge of failure to
bargain by claiming that he did not have a continuing obligation
to bargain with the complaining union. In making that defense,
however, the employer might have looked back to the representation election that took place outside of the limitations period.
Thus, if courts in earlier continuing obligation cases had looked
to the demands upon the defense, the results might have been
different, and in this respect the McCready/Serv-All approach
amounts to a significant departure. In any case, explicitly looking
to the demands upon the defense is a novel approach in the sec3
tion 10(b) statute of limitations area. '
Id. at 952-53.
482 F.2d at 875. See text accompanying notes 15-17 supra.
See 491 F.2d at 1275.
204 F.2d 950 (5th Cir. 1953). See text accompanying notes 25-27 supra.
3' An alternative analysis suggests that although the McCready/Serv-All approach
appears, on its face, to be a radical departure from that used in previous recurrence cases,
the "burden on the defense" doctrine may only be a new label for an old theory. In Local
1424, IAM v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 711 (1960), the Supreme Court stated what has become the
traditional rationale used in recurrence cases. This rationale reasons that in a true recur-
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CONCLUSION

In NLRB v. Serv-All Co., the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit has held, in line with decisions in two other circuits, that
an unfair labor practice charge based upon alleged refusals of an
employer signatory member of a multi-employer association to
execute a contract with the designated union both within and
without the 6-month limitations period would be barred by the
section 10(b) statute of limitations. In finding the charge barred,
the court looked to the burden upon the defense and the staleness
of the operative facts which the defense would need to look to in
making their case.
In support of this approach of looking to the demands upon
the defense, it can be effectively argued that this approach is in
accord with the policies underlying the 10(b) statute of limitations. In this regard the policies underlying section 10(b) have
been discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Local
1424, IAM v. NLRB, 32 in which the Court stated that those policies were:
to bar litigation over past events "after records have been destroyed,
witnesses have gone elsewhere, and recollections of events in question have become dim and confused," H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess., p. 40, and of course to stabilize existing bargaining
relationships.3

In pointing here to the effects of the passage of time upon records,
witnesses and their recollections, the Supreme Court did not distinguish these factors in terms of the charging and charged parties respectively in an unfair labor practice action. In line with
the analysis in the Serv-AUI and McCready cases, the passage of
time has these same undesirable effects with regard to both parties, namely the charging party in presenting his charge, and the
party charged in presenting defenses. In light of this analysis,
looking to the burden upon the defense seems to be a reasonable
rence situation, the latter unfair labor practice must be one in and of itself without
reference to any earlier acts. In other words, if a latter act is an unfair labor practice only
because an earlier one is an unfair labor practice, there is no recurrence and the statute
of limitations begins to run at the time of the first act. Id. at 423. Under this rationale, it
can be seen that in both McCready and Serv-AU, the legality of the alleged recurrence
could be assessed only upon a determination of the legality of the initial refusal to bargain.
Such a determination would require going back to the facts surrounding the initial refusal
to sign the agreement, and this leads to what the Sixth and Tenth Circuits call an
unreasonable burden on the defense. When viewed in this light, the new label is unnecessary and may be overly broad.
32 362 U.S. 411 (1960).
1 Id. at 419.
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requirement. In addition, the Court in the quotation given above
also pointed to the purpose of stabilizing existing bargaining relationships. This looking to stability in the bargaining process emphasizes the fact that the parties involved in that process, the
union and the employer, have an on-going relationship. Given
this two-sided, on-going relationship, it seems reasonable to look
to the demands and burdens upon both sides and to pay special
attention to the possible burdens upon the defense.
Looking to the burdens upon the defense, on the other hand,
can have strikingly undesirable results, in that when the charge
is thereby found to be barred, the offending party is given the
option of engaging in continuing, permanent unfair labor practices of that same type with impunity. To give the Serv-AUI case
as an example, the court's finding that the unfair labor practice
charge is barred allows the employer the possibility of continually
persisting with that particular unfair labor practice with impunity. In other words, the employer could continue in his refusal to
sign the agreement involved with that case; and given that opportunity to so flagrantly thumb his nose at the union, the employer
might find that possibility irresistible.
Richard J. Jerome

